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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Appellee,:

Case No.

940698-CA

v.

:

AMORICO RAMON ARCHULETTA,

: Category No. 2

Defendant-Appellant:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from convictions for burglary of a
dwelling, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-202 (1990) (Count I), theft of a firearms, second degree
felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990)
(Counts II-V), theft, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990) (Counts VI), and possession of a
firearm by a parolee, a second degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(2)(a) (Supp. 1994), in the Seventh
Judicial District Court in and for Carbon County, State of Utah,
the Honorable, Bruce K. Halliday, presiding.

This Court has

jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3 (2) (k) (Supp. 1994).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issues presented in this appeal are:
1.

Did the trial court properly deny defendant's

motion to suppress by concluding that the driver of the car
containing incriminating evidence consented to a search of the

car and/or that the officer's concern for their safety justified
the search of the car?

" [T]he factual findings underlying the

trial court's decision with respect to a motion to suppress the
evidence are reviewed under the deferential 'clearly erroneous'
standard." State v. Bello. 871 P.2d 584, 586 (Utah App. 1994),
cert, denied, 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994) (quoting State v. Pena,
869 P.2d 932, 939 n.4 (Utah 1994)).

The appellate court

"'review[s] the totality of facts and circumstances of the
particular case to determine if the finding of exigency was
proper.'"

City of Orem v. Henrie, 868 P.2d 1384, 1388 (Utah App.

1994) (citing State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987) .
2.

Did Adult Probation and Parole officers have

reasonable suspicion to conduct a second search of the car?
Factual findings are reviewed under the clearly erroneous
standard, as set out in paragraph one, above.

While the

determination of reasonable suspicion is a matter of law reviewed
for correctness, some measure of discretion is accorded the trial
court.

Bello, 871 P.2d at 586 (citing Pena, 869 P.2d at 939).
3.

Has defendant waived consideration of his claim

that evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for
theft of firearms by failing to marshal the evidence in support
of those convictions?

"Failure to marshal the evidence waives an

appellant's right to have his claim of insufficiency considered
on appeal."

State v. Gallecros, 851 P.2d 1185, 1189-90 (Utah App.

1993) (refusing to consider a challenge to the jury's verdicts
for failure to marshal the evidence in support).
2

4.

Should defendant have been charged with only one

count of second degree felony theft for stealing four rifles in a
single criminal episode?

"[The appellate court] independently

review[s] questions of statutory construction for correctness and
do[es] not defer to the trial court."

State v. Simmons, 866 P.2d

614, 616 (Utah App. 1993).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
United States Constitution
Amendment IV

[Unreasonable searches and seizures.]

The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
Utah Code Ann. § (1990)
76-1-401. "Single criminal episode11 defined.
In this part unless the context
requires a different definition,
"single criminal episode" means all
conduct which is closely related in
time and is incident to an attempt or
an accomplishment of a single criminal
objective.

76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal
episode.
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted
in a single criminal action for all
separate offenses arising out of a
single criminal episode;

3

76-6-202. Burglary.
(1) A person is guilty of burglary
if he enters or remains unlawfully in a
building or any portion of a building
with intent to commit a felony or theft
or commit an assault on any person.
(2) Burglary is a felony of the
third degree unless it was committed in
a dwelling, in which event it is a
felony of the second degree.
76-6-404. Theft - Elements.
A person commits theft if he obtains or
exercises unauthorized control over the
property of another with a purpose to
deprive him thereof.
76-6-412. Theft - Classification of offenses - Action for
treble damages against receiver of stolen
property.
(1) Theft of property and services as
provided in this chapter shall be
punishable:
(a) as a felony of the second degree if the:

(ii) property stolen is a firearm or an
operable motor vehicle;

(c) as a class A misdemeanor if the value of the
property stolen was more than $100 but does
not exceed $250 [.]
76-10-503. Purchase or possession of dangerous
weapon/handgun - Persons not permitted to
have - Penalties.

(2) (a) Any person who is
for a felony may not
or under his custody
weapon as defined in

4

on parole or probation
have in his possession
or control any dangerous
this part.

(b) Any person who violates this subsection is
guilty of a third degree felony, but if
the dangerous weapon is a firearm,
explosive, or incendiary device he is
guilty of a second degree felony.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Ramon Amorico Archuletta, was charged in
a seven count amended information with burglary, theft and
possession of a firearm by a parolee (see jurisdictional
statement for precise rendering of charges; R. 39-40).

Before

trial, defendant moved to suppress evidence obtained by police
and Adult Probation and Parole officers (R. 20-21, 120), and to
correct the amended information to include only one count of
theft of a firearm (R. 210-11).

The trial court denied both

motions (R. 200, 214). A jury found defendant guilty on all
counts (R. 570). The trial court sentenced defendant to serve a
term in the Utah State Prison of one to fifteen years for
burglary of a dwelling (Count I) and for theft of a firearm
(Counts II-V), Counts II-V to be served concurrently but
consecutively with Count I; one year for theft (Count VI), to be
served concurrently with Count I; and one to fifteen years for
possession of a firearm by a parolee (Count VII), to be served
consecutively with Counts II-V (R. 99).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On March 23, 1994, dispatch from the Price City
Police Department issued an "attempt to locate" bulletin ("ATL")
about three Hispanic males in a large brown car, license plate
number 581 FAB, attempting to sell firearms at a convenience
5

store in Wellington (R. 122, 157). Officer Mele started to
respond to the dispatch and was almost immediately stopped by an
unidentified woman.

She reported that while she was driving from

Wellington into Price she saw a brown car, license plate number
583 FAB, swerving all over the road before she last saw it near
the Ace Lumber Yard in the east Price area (R. 123-24).
Officer Mele soon located a brown Ford, license
plate number 581 FAB in the Melody Estates Trailer Court (R. 12425).

The car was parked next to a trailer at site number 41,

which Mele knew was occupied by a Teddy Kinneman, who is parolee
(R. 124, 129). Mele immediately requested back-up and then
knocked at the trailer door.

Within about thirty seconds a

Hispanic-looking man, Matthew Roberts, exited the trailer,
closing the door behind him (R. 125).
After being informed of the reported weapons sales
from the car, Roberts first denied that anyone had been driving
the car, but later admitted that the car belonged to his mother
and that he had been driving it, alone.

During this interview

Mele could hear noises from the trailer, though Roberts denied
that anyone was inside (R. 126).
At about this point Officers Mayerson and Boyden
arrived and checked in with Mele (R. 125, 166-67) . Roberts
denied any knowledge of attempts to sell firearms from the car
(R. 126-27).

Mele, however, asked Roberts if they could look in

the car, and both Mele and Boyden heard Roberts give his consent.
Both officers saw two rifles and a gun case, later found to
6

contain another rifle, in plain view on the rear floor board of
the car (R. 127, 129, 137, 168-69, 176-77).

Roberts then

acknowledged that he was a parolee and not supposed to be around
firearms, which Mele confirmed through dispatch (R. 128-29) . At
that point Mele and Boyden arrested Roberts as a parolee in
possession of firearms and removed and secured the weapons for
safety reasons (R. 128-29, 137, 142, 168-69, 177, 180).
Adult Probation and Parole (AP&P) Officer Scott
Olsen overheard Officer Mele's check with dispatch about Roberts'
parole status and, after telling dispatch to inform Mele of
Roberts' parole status, decided to go to the trailer site (R.
140-41).

When Olsen and his supervisor, Terry Marshall, arrived

at the scene, Mele informed Olsen that guns had been found in the
car, which Roberts again admitted to driving (R. 141). Following
Roberts arrest, a body search uncovered keys that fit the car (R.
142) .2
Based on the ATL, Officer Mele's hearing noises from
the trailer, Roberts' admitted use of the car and their knowledge
that Kinneman was also a parolee, Olsen and Marshall decided to
conduct a parole search of the trailer for Kinneman, who would be
violating parole if he were associating with criminals, i.e.,
Roberts, with whom Kinneman had close connections in the past (R.
132, 142, 157-61).

Olsen asked for police assistance because he

1

Although defendant elicited from Officer Olsen that he
did not test the key in the ignition, Olsen testified that
Roberts told him that the keys found in his pocket were the keys
to the car (R. 149-51).
7

did not think that just he and Marshall could safely conduct the
search alone (R. 158-59, 170).
After knocking at the door and requesting that
anyone in the trailer come out and identify themselves, John
Pimental exited.

After Pimental had been handcuffed and secured

in a patrol car (R. 143, 170-71), the officers entered the
trailer and found defendant lying face down on the floor of a
back bedroom (R. 143, 171). Defendant, who smelled strongly of
alcohol, refused to identify himself (R. 144-45, 172-73) .
Because neither of the two suspects in custody would identify
defendant and he had no reason for being in the trailer,
defendant was arrested for trespassing (130, 147). At the jail
defendant identified himself and acknowledged that he had been
paroled the day before (R. 130).
Based on car's connection to Roberts' parole
violation, Olsen searched the car a second time and uncovered
seemingly out-of-place items, including a piggy bank, a camera,
clothing, reloaded rifle cartridges and a briefcase containing
papers belonging to a Veloy Sorensen of East Carbon, Utah (R.
148-49, 160). 2
The defense called Roberts, who claimed that his
mother had not given him permission to use the car, that he had
not driven the car that day and that he had not given his consent

2

The key retrieved from Roberts did not fit either
glove compartment or the trunk (R. 151). Later, Roberts'
gave the key to Marshall (R. 160). A search of the trunk
glove compartment uncovered no incriminating evidence (R.
8

the
mother
and
316).

to search the car (R. 184-85).

He acknowledged, however, that

the "merchandise" was in plain view on the back seat of the car,
all four doors of which were unlocked (R. 185) .3 The rifles, he
claimed, belonged to a hitchhiker (R. 127).
At trial, Officers Mele, Olsen and Boyden testified
to substantially the same facts adduced during the motion to
suppress (R. 258-320, 348-51) .
Earlier in the day on which Mele responded to the
ATL, conservation Officers Michael Milburn Kurt Enright of the
Utah Division of Wildlife Resources were traveling from Price to
East Carbon along state highway 6 (R. 392-393).

As their patrol

vehicle approached Sunnyside Junction, the intersection of routes
6 and 123, Officer Milburn saw a car, which was coming from the
direction of East Carbon, abruptly stop at the intersection and
back into the parking area where an Associated Food semitruck was
stopped (R. 393, 395). The car, which he identified as that
pictured in State's exhibit 1, appeared to have three male
occupants (R. 393, 395).4
Scott Record, the driver of the Associated Foods
truck, testified that the driver of the car, which had three
occupants and was that pictured in State's exhibit 1, got out
hurriedly and approached him (R. 399-401).

The driver offered to

sell him a rifle or a VCR for $20, but Record declined (R. 402).
3

Roberts' discussion also suggests that at least one of
the rear windows was rolled down (R. 185).
4

At trial, Officer Mele had identified the car he found at
the trailer court from a photograph, State's exhibit 1 (R. 263).
9

Although he could not say for sure, the driver bore a strong
resemblance to defendant (R. 404-06).5
Officer Olsen stated that upon uncovering the fruits
of the search he wondered if a burglary had taken place, and he
initiated contact with the East Carbon police to check Sorensen's
home in East Carbon (R. 314). Police Officer Robert Setzer went
to the Sorensen residence, saw a broken window and displacement
of some things beneath the window inside the house (R. 373). He
contacted Kathy Bean, Sorensen's daughter, and together they
entered the front door, which was slightly ajar (373-74).
According to Bean, the house had been locked when her father went
out of town on Monday, two days earlier (R. 412-13). Inside they
found broken glass and things askew (R. 374), including her
mother's jewelry box, which she had never seen anywhere but on a
dresser in the back bedroom, on the kitchen counter (R. 414).
Sorensen confirmed his daughter's report of his
home's disarray and the irregular placement of the jewelry box
(R. 423). He identified the items missing from his home,
including those items found in the search of the car found at the

5

When asked to identify the person whom he believed to be
driving the car, Record pointed out an individual wearing a
checked shirt sitting to the prosecutor's left (R. 406).
Defendant is not identified in the record by name. However, the
prosecutor specifically stated in closing that Record had
identified defendant (R. 558, 566), a point not challenged by
defendant at trial or on appeal. Other evidence tying defendant
to the car was the discovery of his personal papers in the car
(R. 468) and the fact that he was married to Roberts' mother,
Viola Archuletta, owner of the car (R. 350-51).
10

trailer court.6

He also testified that the value of the stolen

items, other than the weapons, including those which were not
recovered, was more than $250 (R. 430-31) . Neither he nor his
daughter had ever seen defendant or given defendant permission to
enter his home (R. 418, 431-32).
Price City Police Officer Edwin Shook lifted latent
fingerprints from various items, including the jewelry box (R.
433-38) , and sent them to Scott Spjut, latent print examiner for
the Department of Public Safety (R. 440, 451-52, 460). Mr. Spjut
found that one of the prints lifted from the bottom of the
jewelry box matched defendant's left middle finger (R. 461-62).
He testified that there was no chance that the fingerprint could
have been that of another individual (R. 465).
Roberts testified for the defense, assuming full
responsibility for the thefts and burglary and claiming that
defendant repudiated Roberts' breaking in and told him to return
the jewelry box to the house before leaving the car in disgust.
Later, after having loaded the rest of the goods into the back
seat of the car, Roberts and Pimental picked defendant up and
asked him to drive them to the trailer (R. 503-07).

6

The search uncovered a .22 calibre rifle (Ex. 2, R. 285),
a .243 calibre rifle (Ex. 3, R. 270), a .270 calibre rifle and
case (Ex. 4, R. 270), an ammunition pouch (Ex. 5, R. 286), a
piggy bank (Ex. 6, R. 315), a briefcase (Ex. 7, R. 313-14), a
pair of Bushnell binoculars (Ex. 8, R. 356), three pairs of
gloves (Ex.'s 9 and 10, R. 357-58), a sweatshirt (Ex. 11, R.
358), a bathrobe (Ex. 12, R. 358), two shirts (Ex.'s 13 and 14,
R. 358-59), and a corduroy coat (Ex. 16, R. 360). Sorensen
identified each of these items as his own (R. 426-430).
11

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
The trial court properly denied defendant's motion
to suppress the police officers' warrantless search of the car.
The trial court found that the driver of the car
gave his consent to the search.

Defendant has not challenged on

appeal the trial court's ruling that consent was given.

Because

consent is a recognized exception to both the warrant and
probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment, and because
defendant has waived this determinative issue on appeal, the
Court must uphold the trial court's finding.

The consent alone

is sufficient to validate the warrantless search of the car.
As an alternative ground for denying defendant's
motion to suppress, the trial court ruled that the officers
justifiably removed the firearms from the car because they
genuinely feared for their safety.

The record supports the

propriety of the warrantless search of the car under the weapons
exception.

The investigating officers, admittedly concerned for

their safety, were in the presence of a parole violator who was
in close proximity to firearms and the trailer in which others
reasonably suspected of criminal activity were hiding.
On appeal defendant raises challenges to the
probable cause supporting the officers search of the car.
However, defendant did not challenge the prosecution's arguments
in support of probable cause, but rather conceded them.
Therefore, defendant has waived this argument on appeal.
12
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE
OBTAINED IN THE INITIAL WARRANTLESS
SEARCH OF THE CAR
Defendant challenges the trial court's denial of his
motion to suppress evidence obtained during warrantless searches
of the car Roberts claimed to have been driving and of the
trailer.

Defendant's main point is that the police improperly

relied on Roberts' parole status to search the car without a
warrant when there were no exigent circumstances or probable
cause to search when a warrant could readily have been obtained.
Therefore, the initial search of the car was a violation of his
rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution.
Appellant's Br. at 9-13.7

In so arguing defendant has not only

7

Defendant only nominally asserted state constitutional
law grounds in his suppression motion (R. 20) and did not argue
it at the suppression hearing. Therefore, this Court should not
consider applying a separate state constitutional analysis on
appeal. See State v. Scott, 860 P.2d 1005, 1007 n.3 (Utah App.
1993) (refusing to address a standing claim under article I,
section 14, because it was not briefed under the standards
suggested for adequate briefing of state constitutional issues in
State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1272 n.5 (Utah App. 1990)); State
v. Yates, 834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah App. 1992) (declining to
consider inadequately developed argument under Utah Rule of
Appellate Procedure 24 (a)(9)); State v. Horton, 848 P.2d 708,
710-11 (Utah App. 1993) (refusing to engage in a separate state
constitutional analysis where defendant merely alluded to the
state constitution and did not provide any reason for adopting an
analysis different than that applied under the federal
constitution) cert, denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993); State v.
Bean, 869 P.2d 894 (Utah App. 1994) (same); State v. Carter, 812
P.2d 460, 462 n.l (Utah App. 1991) (same) cert, denied. 836 P.2d
1383 (Utah 1992).
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consent in spite of his contrary testimony (R. 198). 9

See State

v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah 1993) (recognizing the
"trial court's advantaged position in judging credibility and
resolving evidentiary conflicts"); Casida v. DeLand, 866 P.2d
599, 602 (Utah App. 1993) (recognizing the trial court's
prerogative to judge the credibility of witnesses and its freedom
to disbelieve a witness's self-serving testimony).
An appellate court will not consider issues, even
constitutional ones, raised for the first time on appeal.

The

only exceptions are "exceptional circumstances" or plain error.
State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247, 248 n.2 (Utah App. 1992).
On appeal defendant does not even address the issue
of consent, the primary basis of his motion to suppress (R. 19598).

Because defendant has not even challenged the trial court's

ruling on consent, the trial court's finding that valid consent
was given must be upheld.

Price, 827 P.2d at 248 n.2 (refusing

to consider allegations of illegal detention on appeal which were
not raised during suppression hearings).

On the basis of

Roberts' consent alone, this Court should find that the trial
court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress.
9

The record supports the trial court's finding of consent.
Both Officers Mele and Boyden collectively testified that Roberts
said he had been driving the car (R. 126, 168), that the car
belonged to his mother (R. 126) and that Roberts gave them
permission to search the car for weapons (R. 127, 168). The
trial court had little respect for Roberts' denial of his
consent, based on his having lied to officers about the presence
of others in the trailer, and rejected it in the face of the
officer's contrary testimony, noting that a mother typically
allows her son to use her car and that there was no evidence to
show that Roberts' mother was readily available (R. 195-96).
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defendant Cole exchanged a $1,000 worth of small denomination
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bills for $50 and $100 bills at a local grocery store, after
which the store employee reported the incident.

The police

almost immediately stopped Cole's truck for a legitimate moving
violation.

During an inventory search and upon discovering a

marijuana bong and twelve bags of marijuana, the police asked
Cole if there were any firearms in the truck, and he twice
replied no.

However, one of the officers saw a half concealed

leather pistol case among the clothes Cole was removing from the
truck.

Fearing for the safety of the other officers and

suspicious because of Cole's apparent lies about the firearms,
one policeman opened the case and seized a 9mm Colt pistol.

The

police then elicited from Cole that he had been convicted of a
felony, whereupon Cole was arrested for being a convicted felon
in possession.

Id. at 121-22.

The supreme court upheld the

warrantless seizure, finding that "the officer clearly had reason
to be suspicious of defendant," under the reasonableness standard
in Terry.

Cole, 674 P.2d at 124.
An evaluation of the reasonableness of an officer's

conduct when presented with a threat to his or the public's
safety is made considering the totality of the circumstances.
State v. White, 856 P.2d 656, 666 (Utah App. 1993).
In this case the presence of firearms in a
potentially volatile situation was the primary reason for their
seizure and the exigency most strenuously argued by the
prosecution (R. 191-93) . Officers Mele and Boyden responded to
an ATL informing them three males were attempting to sell weapons
18
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C.

Defendant Failed to Preserve His Claim that
Police Officers Lacked Probable Cause to Search
On appeal defendant argues that selling firearms out

of a vehicle is not a public offense (R. 123). Appellant's Br.
at 9-10.

Therefore, defendant argues, police officers lacked

either reasonable suspicion or probable cause of any wrongdoing.
Appellant's Br. at 9.

Defendant, however, failed to preserve

this argument for appeal.
As noted above, Appellee's Br. at 16, an appellate
court will not consider issues, even constitutional ones, raised
for the first time on appeal.

State v. Price, 827 P.2d at 248

n.2. The rationale for this rule was stated by this Court in
State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358 (Utah App. 1993):
10

In addition to consent and the weapons exceptions, the
search incident to arrest, see State v. Rochell, 850 P.2d 480,
484 (Utah App. 1993), and the plain view exceptions, see State v.
Cayer, 814 P.2d 604, 610-11 (Utah App. 1991), are applicable to
this case. Although these grounds were not argued to the trial
court, they constitute alternative grounds that would support the
trial court's ruling. See State v. Elder, 815 P.2d 1341, 1344
n.4 (Utah App. 1991) (noting that one exception to the rule that
the appellate court will not address a claim first raised on
appeal stems from "the rule that [the appellate court] may affirm
trial court decisions on any proper ground, even though the trial
court assigned another reason for its ruling").
Officers Mele and Boyden were lawfully outside the trailer
when they encountered Roberts, having responded to an ATL
indicating suspicious criminal activity. Even Roberts admitted
the firearms were in plain view (R. 185). Roberts acknowledged
his parole status to Mele before the car was searched (R. 128).
Thereafter, Roberts was arrested and the firearms then removed
from the car (R. 128). On these facts the warrantless search of
the car would have been justified on both the search incident to
arrest and plain view exceptions to the warrant requirement.
20

The purpose of requiring a properly presented
objection is to 'putt] the judge on notice of
the asserted error and allow[] the
opportunity for correction at that time in
the course of the proceeding.' Broberg v.
H e s s , 782 P.2d 198, 201 (Utah A p p . 1 9 8 9 ) .
The trial court is considered 'the p r o p e r
forum in which to commence thoughtful and
probing analysis' of issues. State v. Bobo,
803 P.2d II 268, 1273 (Utah A p p , 1990)
(requiring defendants to introduce their
request for state constitutional
interpretation before the trial c o u r t ) .
Failing to argue an issue and present
pertinent evidence in that forum denies the
trial court 'the opportunity to make any
findings of fact or conclusions of law'
pertinent to the claimed error. LeBaron &
A s s o c , v. Rebel Enter., 823 P.2d 4 79, 4 83 n 6
(Utah A p p , 1991) (discussing Turtle
M a n a g e m e n t , Inc. v. H a g g i s M a n a g e m e n t , Inc.,
645 P.2d 667 (Utah 1 9 8 2 ) ) .

However,, at the suppression hearing defendant
conceded the issues of reasonable suspicion and probable cause,

support of probable cause, defense counsel sialej
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because defendant had effectively conceded the point (R. 190200).

In having conceded the issue of whether the police lacked

either reasonable suspicion or probable cause to suspect
wrongdoing or to search, and because defendant has not argued
that exceptional circumstances prevented him from raising the
claim or that the trial court committed plain error, this Court
should decline to address this point on its merits.
In sum, the record abundantly supports the trial
court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress the evidence
seized during the initial search of car.
POINT II
ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE OFFICERS HAD
NOT ONLY REASONABLE SUSPICION BUT ALSO
PROBABLE CAUSE TO SEARCH THE CAR A
SECOND TIME
Defendant argues that the intrusion of AP&P was
merely a subterfuge allowing police officers to search the
trailer and the car a second time when they would not have had
such authority on their own. Appellant's Br. at 12-14.

He also

argues that AP&P did not have reasonable suspicion for the two
searches.

Appellant's Br. at 15-16.

The arguments misrepresent

the facts established at the suppression hearing and are without
legal merit.
In his motion to suppress defendant did not
challenge AP&P's search of the trailer (R. 20), nor did he attack
the search of the trailer at the suppression hearing (R. 199).
Therefore, defendant has waived this issue on appeal.
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authority acting be able to point to
specific and articulable facts that,
taken together with rational inferences
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Id. at 1260 n.5 quoting United States
v. Scott, 678 F.2d 32, 35 (5th Cir.
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In any event, AP&P had reasonable S U S p i c i o n to search
the trailer. Olsen also knew that the trailer belonged to
Kinneman, another parolee, who had close past associations with
Roberts (R. 142, 157,, 159) . According to Olsen, it would have
been a violation of Kinneman's parole if he was associating with
other criminals (R 158). Based on the noises coming from the
trailer, suggesting the possibility that Kinneman was living with
parolees who might be selling weapons, Olsen decided to search
the trailer (R. 155-56). With the assistance of police (R. 158,
170), Olsen and Marshall searched the trailer and found
defendant., but no other contraband (R. 143-44).
23

added) .
The basis for the parolee's diminished expectation
of privacy lies in the state's need to administer the parole
system "as a controlled passageway between prison and freedom."
State v. Blackwell, 809 P.2d 135, 137 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting
Velasquez, 672 P.2d at 1258) (urinalysis on reasonable suspicion
that parolee had used controlled substances).
Further, "a parole officer's search of the premises
'is not unlawful just because it is also beneficial to the
police.'"

Johnson, 748 P.2d at 1072 (quoting Velasquez, 674 P.2d

at 1262, and noting that the parole search was led by a parole
officer having a reasonable and articulable suspicion based on
probable cause for the parolee's having committed forgery).
At the time of the events in this case Roberts was
being supervised by AP&P, though not by Officer Olsen personally
(R. 140). Olsen overheard a broadcast of a dispatch that
Roberts' probation status was being checked, advised dispatch to
inform the officers on the scene that Roberts was on parole and
went to the trailer site with his supervisor, Terry Marshall (R.
140-42).

Officer Mele reported to Olsen that Roberts was in

control of a car containing firearms (R. 141). After a brief
interview, in which Roberts admitted driving the car, Roberts was
arrested for possession of firearms (R. 141-42).

Subsequently,

Olsen conducted a search based on Roberts' admitted control of
the car (R. 148, 159-61).

The search yielded evidence later

linked to the burglary in East Carbon (R. 148).
24

The prosecution argued that because Kinneman and
Roberts were parolees in violation of their parole status AP&P
reasonably searched the trailer and car (R. 193-94).

Defendant,

focussing only on AP&P's search of the car, asserted that the
police called in AP&P to conduct a warrantless search knowing
that they (the police) lacked the authority (R. 199). The trial
court rejected the insinuation, noting that AP&P officers had
independently responded to the broadcast (R. 200). Noting facts
that demonstrated probable cause, i.e., Roberts' arrest as a
parolee with firearms, the trial court ruled the AP&P search of
the car proper (R. 200). Therefore, the trial court correctly
denied defendant's motion to suppress.
POINT III
BECAUSE DEPENDANT HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL
THE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF HIS
CONVICTIONS, DEFENDANT HAS WAIVED HIS
RIGHT ON APPEAL TO CHALLENGE THE
SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
11

' In order to bring a claim of insufficiency of

evidence, an appellant 'must marshal the evidence supporting the
. . . findings and demonstrate how the evidence, including all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support
the disputed findings.'

Failure to marshal the evidence waives

an appellant's right to have his claim of insufficiency
considered on appeal."

Gallegos, 851 P.2d at 1189-90 (citation

omitted) (refusing to consider a challenge to the jury's verdicts
for failure to marshal the evidence in support).
Defendant was convicted of burglary, theft and
25

possession of a firearm by a parolee (R. 99). On appeal he
claims that the evidence was insufficient to support only his
convictions for theft of firearms. Appellant's Br. at 18-19.12
In rendering guilty verdicts, the jury evidently found beyond a
reasonable doubt that defendant had obtained or exercised
unauthorized control over firearms belonging to Veloy Sorensen
with the purpose of depriving him of that property.
Defendant has substantially failed to marshal the
evidence in support of those verdicts.
here, includes:

That evidence, summarized

On March 23, 1994 dispatch broadcast an ATL

identifying a car, by license number, having three Hispanic males
occupants attempting to sell weapons from the car (R. 259-60); an
in-court identification of defendant as the driver of that car
and the one who offered earlier on March 23 to sell the witness a
VCR or firearm, the type of property stolen from a nearby
residence (R. 401-06, 430); a witness's observation that the car
was swerving all over the road, suggesting the driver was
inebriated, just before the car was located at the trailer park
(R. 260) ; the discovery of the car outside a trailer in which
defendant, intoxicated beyond the legal limit, was hiding (R.
309, 318); the discovery that the car contained a variety of
Sorensen's property stolen from his home, including the firearms
(R. 270, 285-86, 313-15, 357-60, 426-32); the car was owned by

12

Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of evidence
supporting his convictions for burglary and possession of a
firearm by a parolee. The evidence plainly supports these
convictions.
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defendant's wife, who is the mother of another individual
(Roberts) found hiding with defendant in the trailer (R. 350-51) ;
defendant's companions were Hispanic-looking, further confirming
that the ATL referred to defendant and his companions (R. 264,
289); defendant's personal papers were found in the car (R. 468);
defendant's fingerprint was found on a jewelry box in Sorensen's
home (R. 461-62); Sorensen's home had been burglarized (R. 373,
421-23); and Sorensen had never seen defendant before nor given
him permission to be in his home (R. 432).
For failing to marshal these facts this Court should
refuse to review defendant's claim that the evidence was
insufficient to convict him of theft of firearms.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY PERMITTED
DEFENDANT TO BE CHARGED WITH MULTIPLE
COUNTS OF THEFT OF FIREARMS AND
PROPERTY STOLEN DURING A SINGLE
CRIMINAL EPISODE
Defendant claims that he should have been charged
only with a single count of second degree felony theft relating
to the theft of all four firearms (Counts II-V).13
Br. at 16-18.

Appellant's

The State concedes this point, and further, notes

that a single second degree theft charge should have embraced all
of the theft counts, including Count VI charging a class A
misdemeanor theft for all other property stolen in excess of $100

13

The amended information (R. 38-39) is attached at
Addendum B.
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but not more that $250.14
In State v. Mickel, the Utah Supreme Court employed
"the single larceny doctrine," stating:

"Where many articles are

stolen at one time, there is only one theft, whether the
ownership is in one or in many."
511, 65 P. 484, 485 (1901).

State v. Mickel, 23 Utah 507,

Accord, State v. Barker, 624 P.2d

694, 695 (Utah 1981) (citing Mickel with approval).
In State v. Casias, 772 P.2d 975 (Utah App. 1989),
the defendant was convicted of two counts of second degree felony
theft for having stolen a firearm plus personal property worth
more than $1,000 during a single criminal episode.

On appeal the

State argued that Casias could be prosecuted "for all separate
offenses arising out of a single criminal episode."
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (1978)).

Id. (citing

Casias contended that he

should only have been charged with a single theft count.

This

Court agreed with Casias, noting that the offense of theft under
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1978), requires that the actor
"obtain [] or exercise [] unauthorized control over the property of
another . . . ."

Id. at 977 (emphasis in original).

Since the

statute identifies unauthorized control over property generally
as the essential element of the offense, the penalty distinctions
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(1) (1978), based on type of property
or aggregate value are classifications significant for sentencing
purposes and do not constitute separate elements of the offense.

14

The arguments and the trial court's ruling are attached
at Addendum C.
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Id. at 911-IS.

The Court concluded, therefore, that Casias

committed one theft only, vacated the second theft conviction and
remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its
holding.

JcL at 978.
In this case defendant was charged with four counts

of second degree felony theft (Counts II-V) for the theft of four
rifles (R. 38-39).

He was also charged with a class A

misdemeanor for stealing property having a value between $100 and
$250 (Count VI) (R. 39). Prior to trial defendant moved the
trial court to combine the rifle thefts in a single count (R.
210).

The prosecution never presented any evidence that the

thefts occurred other than in a single criminal episode.
The trial court, confronted by essentially the same
arguments made in Casias, denied defendant's motion (R. 211-114).
Defendant did not move that Count VI, theft of property worth
between $100 and $250, should also be combined in a single theft
count, nor does he so argue on appeal.

Defendant was convicted

on all theft counts and sentenced to four terms of one to fifteen
years on Counts II through V to be served concurrently but
consecutively with Count I, and one year on Count VI to be served
concurrently with Count I (R. 99).
On the authority of Casias, the State acknowledges
that defendant should have been charged with a single count of
second degree felony theft, instead of with five counts of theft.
Therefore, based on the trial court's original sentencing scheme,
the State respectfully requests that all the theft charges, with
29

the exception of one second degree felony theft charge, be
vacated, and that the case be remanded to the trial court with
instructions to resentence defendant to serve a term, on a single
count of second degree felony theft, of one to fifteen years
consecutively with Count I.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing argument, the State
requests that defendant's convictions for burglary and possession
of a firearm by a parolee be affirmed.

The State further

requests that all the theft charges, with the exception of one
second degree felony theft charge, be vacated, and that the case
be remanded to the trial court with instructions to resentence
defendant to serve a term, on a single count of second degree
felony theft, of one to fifteen years consecutively with Count I.
ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED
In accordance with procedures concerning oral
argument and the issuance of opinions, effective January 1, 1995,
the State does not request oral argument based on this Court's
prior development of the issues raised in this case.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

ff

day of January 1994.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

KENNETH A. BRONSTON
Assistant Attorney General

30

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies
of the foregoing brief of appellee was mailed, postage prepaid,
to David M. Allred, attorney for appellant, 26 East Main Street
Post Office Box 575, Castle Dale, Utah 84513, this / f
January, 1994.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

MOTION TO SUPPRESS HEARING,
ARGUMENTS AND RULING

81
1 I is your copy and this means you1re to be here in Court today and]
2 I tomorrow.
THE COURT: Any other witnesses, Mr. Allred?
4

MR. ALLRED:

5

MR. HARMOND:

6

No, your Honor.
May we have a chance to summarize, your

Honor?

7

THE COURT: Briefly.

8

MR. HARMOND:

9

Officer Mele had two items of probable cause when he

I will try to be brief.

10

pulled up to that trailer and saw the brown car.

11

an eyewitness who had spoken to him, minutes before, that this

12

car with this license plate number, this color with three people|

13

in it, had been driving as if they were drunk; in fact, had cut

14

her off trying to get on the freeway--get off the freeway. That

15

this car was dangerous and she believed them to be intoxicated.

16

He had, one,

He had an A-T-L report, same license plate number, carj

17

matching the same descrip--description and three males, trying

18

to sell guns out of the car.

19

He was

told

by Mr.

Roberts that

Mr. Roberts

was

20

driving the vehicle, that it was his motherfs vehicle and that

21

he could look in

22

tell me--he knew that Teddy Kinneman lived there, this man was

23

not Teddy Kinneman.

24

the car after they saw the guns.

Mr. Roberts

25

trailer, even

denied there were

though Officer

Mele could

He didn't

other people

in the

hear noises in

the

I
n r\ n i o

1

trailer.

The only person who admitted to having anything to do

2

with that vehicle that day.

3

The other--testimony of the other officers is, after

4

they

5

anything, didn't

6

anybody anything.

7

all of the

8

owned that car,

9

given Officer Boyden and Officer Mele permission to look in the

10
11

brought the

other witnesses

out,

know anything about

they denied

the car,

The only

police officers had

wouldn't tell

information that

was that Mr.

that he had been

knowing

Roberts' mother

driving it and that

he had

car.
Officer Boyden testified he saw the weapons in plain

12

view, he had the same information, that there was an attempt to

13

locate on this car, with this license plate number, that three

14

people were selling weapons out of the car. There were weapons

15

in the car when he saw it.

16

We have three things operating here.

First, we have

17

a consent to search, now Mr. Roberts denies; of course, he also

18

admits to lying to the officers that day, so I don't know what

19

credibility he has.

20

We have two items of exigent circumstances that would

21

allow the officers to

search; one, on the crime

22

sell the weapons and possession of weapons

23

other thing they knew is that this man was on parole.

24

So,

they've

25

somebody driving drunk;

got three

items

of trying to

by a parolee.

of

probable

somebody--a parolee in

The

cause;

possession of

Associated Professional Reporters
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1

weapons; the windows in the car were open, there was ammunition

2

on the floor; I don't think these officers did anything wrong in|

3

this situation.

4
5

Maybe they could have gotten
Boyden testified--

6
7

THE COURT: Well, there's no question they could have
got a warrant.

8
9

a warrant, but Officer

MR. HARMOND:

They could

have got--yeah, they could

have; but Officer--Officer Boyden testified that their policy is]

10

officer safety.

You've got

a gentleman

11

gentleman here who's lied to the officers, you've got noises in

12

the trailer, you've got people there—you've got a person there

13

who is not a

14

weapons, with

15

There's no violation of any search and seizure.

resident of the trailer.
permission.

There's

He

here, you've got

a

simply secured the

nothing wrong

with that.

16

Besides, we've got the exigent circumstances. You've

17

got three or four pieces of evidence that said there's weapons

18

being sold out of this car, possibly

19

the weapons.

20

I think the officers' action in securing those weapons]

21

is more

22

there's anything wrong with that.

23

illegally; and there are

than sensible

under the

situation.

As far as a--a warrant to
no evidence found

in the

I don't

think

search the trailer, there

24

was really

trailer; but they

25

noises in the trailer, you have two officers, Officer Olsen and
Associated Professional Reporters
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1

Officer Mele, who knew

2

there.

3

violation; they had plenty of probable cause

4

and search a parolee's house, they had

5

that, and plenty of exigent circumstances.

6

He

is

Teddy Kinneman.

also on

parole,

He is

which is

not the person

another

possible

to go over there

plenty of reason to do

We don't know who's in there. We don't know if they

7

have weapons.

8

few minutes.

9

the circumstances, your Honor.

10

We don't know what's going to happen in the next
I think their--they were acting reasonably under

As far as the search of the

car, Mr. Roberts was on

11

parole, admits to several things. They search the car based on

12

that.

13

Mr. Roberts said,

14

keys.

Nobody know--nobody said anything different than what
I was driving

the car today, here

are the

15

So, we'll submit it on that basis, your Honor.

16

THE COURT: Mr. Allred?

17

MR. ALLRED:

I guess the first thing to start is, if

18

there was probable cause to do all these things, why didn't they

19

just obtain a warrant? That's the biggest thing that stands out

20

in my mind, we have a warrantless search here, that poses heavy

21

burdens on the State to prove these things.

22

The

exigent--as far

as

exigent circumstances

are

23

concerned, we don't have anything linking these vehicles--this--

24

these reports with any particular individuals when they arrived.

25

They knew who the

car belonged to.

He

Associated Professional Reporters
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1

from the very beginning, he told them he didn't have a driver's

2

license and first told them in fact, he wasn't driving it. The

3

testimony today was

4

doesn't let him drive it.

5

that he never

has driven it,

his mother

For the search, even if he did give consent, which he

6

claims he did not, even if he did

7

consent to be valid, he must be

8

that he

9

occurred, he wasn't in the vehicle, he wasn't near the vehicle,

had

possession and

give that consent, for that

able to--the State must prove

control of

the

vehicle.

This

10

he was in the house. There was nothing to indicate that he had

11

control and possession of that vehicle.

12
13

THE COURT:

Did he

have common authority

over the

MR. ALLRED:

He doesn't have the rights, the rights,

area?

14
15

the superior rights lie with Mr. Archuletta and with the mother

16

THE COURT: But had he--had he said something, might--

17

you might have an arguable point; but

18

got an arguable point, Mr. Allred, under these circumstances.

19

I agree

with the

I--I don't think you've

State's contentions and--and

the

20

evidence.

You--you have some evidence that--coming from--from

21

Mr. Roberts that there was no consent, but you have two officers

22

that--that you'd

23

you'd have me believe

24

when

25

Mr. Roberts was

have this Court

believe are

lying, whereas

that Mr. Roberts is telling

lying, on the day

the truth,

that it happened.

Associated Professional Reporters
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can't do that.
2 1

MR. ALLRED:

But even if there

is consent, we still

that hefs

common owner,

3

have that

4

doesn't have possession of the car.

5

control issue,

THE COURT:
the officers

not a

he

But--but he claimed to, you know, I mean

6

and

7

statement that it belonged to his mother, and of course, mothers

8

let sons use their cars all the time.

9

had

MR. ALLRED:

nothing

else to--to--other

than

his

But we can't let officers, just because

10

they believe

11

believe something. The best person to have got permission from,

12

they had knowledge of that, they had opportunities for one--they

13

had opportunities to do it right.

14
15

something, go

THE COURT: Well,

make searches

just because

but did they know where

they

she was?

How far it would be?

16

MR. ALLRED:

They went--they

went right after this,

17

they went, when they finished their search, they went and got a

18

key to

19

search, they went and got a key to the trunk and completed their

20

search, from her; so that was readily available.

21
22
23
24
25

the trunk, 'cause--'cause

they hadn't

finished their

THE COURT: Well, but there's nothing in evidence to
that effect.

Thatfs the first time I've--

MR. ALLRED:

Well, no,

the reports all--the reports

all list this.
THE COURT:

Sorry.

That's the first time
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1

aware of that.

2

I think unless somebody said--

MR. ALLRED:

There's nothing

proved anything

to indicate,

3

State hasn't

4

doesn't change that--that

5

fact that the

6

have any evidence

7

didn't have keys to the vehicle, no one--those keys--

It

have the

vehicle's trunk was searched and--and

we don't

that--well, we have Matthew saying

THE COURT:

9

MR. HARMOND: No.

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. ALLRED:

that he

Is there evidence in the trunk--

--that you're trying to suppress?
Only that

she was available--only that

she was available to seek permission from her.

13
14

that, either.

they did search, we still

8

12

contrary to

and the

THE COURT: And it's your--and--and your point is that
it's only her, only she that can consent o r -

is

MR. ALLRED: Or Mr. Roberts' mother, that he wasn't in

16

a position--if you turn the tables on

17

was the person

18

object to

19

Mr. Archu--I mean

20

giving consent to the police. On the same token, he can't then

21

therefore give police consent to search, either, that he's not

22

the one who has the rights to do that.

23

case law to support that.

giving consent for

that; if Mr. Archuletta

the son, the

stepson, couldn't object to

24

MR. HARMOND:

25

we're--it's consisting

Your Honor,
of a police

son couldn't

Mr. Archuletta

And I believe there's

we would say

again that

officer who comes

Associated Professional Reporters
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1

potentially explosive situation, where we know there are weapons

2

involved.

3

somebody driving this car was drunk, that there are problems all;

4

the way around, (inaudible)

5

person out here saying it's my car, or my mother's car, I'm the

6

one who was driving it.

7

weapons, but I don't know his name.

We've got at

least one

eyewitness who said

who's in the trailer.

that

There's a

I picked up a hitchhiker who had some

8

We have noises in the trailer, there's nobody--

9

THE COURT:

I just

think that

there are

10

circumstances under the--that

11

further believe that the consent of the--of the son is effective!

12

in the position here, where no one else has

13

authority to give

14

that his--his mother was

15

testimony as to the where--to where her--where the mother was;

16

but even if she were available, his testimony that--that he had

17

possession of the automobile with the owner's consent would give|

18

him the

19

consent to the officers and to give

20

proceed with a--with a consent search.

21
22

we have here, that

exigent

the owner of the car.

MR. ALLRED:

did represent
There was no

allow the--to

give the

the officers authority to

But there's nothing to indicate that he

had that consent.

23

THE COURT: Well, the only--

24

MR. ALLRED:

25

claimed any--any

that consent, even though he

indicia of--necessary to--to

I--and I--I

They've put on no

evidence that he had

consent.
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1

THE COURT:

The only evidence we had was two officers

2

that say that this individual said that, he has disclaimed that,

3

I understand that, and it--

4

MR. ALLRED:

But you--

5

THE COURT: And I--I'm making the decision that I--

6

MR. ALLRED:

Then I can address one of the other--one

7

of the other searches.

8

I address one of the other searches?

9

THE COURT: Yes.

10

MR. ALLRED:

That was--that's the first search; can

There--there was a case, a

Utah case,

11

State vs. Johnson, where the defendant claimed that police used

12

the parole officers for the purpose of negating the necessity of

13

obtaining a warrant.

14

past concerning that, and they can work together; but when the

15

police have

16

parolee, this case refers to that each time that they can do the

17

search, when the proper warrants have been obtained first.

18

obtained

Police officers have

an arrest,

an arrest

been warned in the

warrant for

the

Here, we have a situation that they could have called,

19

they could have done things different,

but to circumvent this

20

whole, that they call A P & P to come in an do the searches for

21

them so that they don't have to go obtain the warrants.

22

MR. HARMOND:

23

THE COURT: But I--but I don't think the facts sustain

24
25

I--

that.
MR. HARMOND: Right.
aoenniafo^

Dmfoeeiftnal

Ponnrfprc

1

THE COURT:

The--ths

facts are

that the

officers

2

overheard the--the broadcast, came on their own to the--to the

3

scene, to

4

jurisdiction.

5

situa--or that this factual situation is anywhere close to the

6

Johnson factual situation, and in reality, it seems to the Court

7

that--and this comes down to the--to the subsequent car search,

8

that--that when you have the officer, or when you have the--the

9

individual charged with a crime and arrested with a crime and--

check on a

known individual

that was under

their

I don't--I don't think that the Johnson factual

10

and

recovered

11

possession of--of--of firearms by a parolee, can't they continue]

12

the search, can't

13

anything else?

14

the--the

evidence

they finish the

the

crime,

search and see

that

is,

if there's

They've arrested the man that said that he was driving]

15

the car and--and

16

finish

17

get into the trunk at that time?

18

taken the weapons,

can't they go

ahead and

the search? Do they have to get a search warrant to--to
I don't--I think not.

At any rate, your motion to suppress for the number of

19

grounds stated is hereby denied.

20

MR. ALLRED:

21

needs to be addressed

22

filed a

23

afternoon, before the holiday.

24

Tuesday afternoon.

25

of

We

have one other matter that

probably at this basis.

motion to amend,

a motion was
I just

I think

The State has

filed late

on Friday

received the motion on

I think we probably need to address that motion, if we]
Associated Professional Reporters
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ADDENDUM B

AMENDED INFORMATION

GEORGE M. HARMOND, JR. #1375
DEPUTY CARBON COUNTY ATTORNEY
120 EAST MAIN STREET
PRICE, UTAH 84501
(801)-637-4700
IN THE DISTRICT COURT WITHIN AND FOR
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

AMENDED
INFORMATION

V.

AMORICO RAMON ARCHULETTA,
Defendant.

Criminal No. 941700139FS
Judge Bruce K. Halliday

COMES now the Carbon County Attorney, and states on
information and belief that the above-named defendant committed the
following crime:
DATE:
PLACE:

On or about March 23, 1994
Carbon County, State of Utah

COUNT I:
BURGLARY OF A DWELLING, a Second Degree Felony, in violation of
Section 76-6-202, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, in that the said defendant, at the time
and place aforesaid, unlawfully entered the dwelling of another with the intent to commit a theft,
to-wit: house belonging to VELOY SORENSON;
COUNT II:
THEFT OF A FIREARM, a Second Degree Felony, in violation of Section 76-6404, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the said defendant, at the time and place
aforesaid, did obtain or exercise unauthorized control over the property of another, with a purpose
to deprive him thereof, to-wit: Remington Model 700, .243 cal. rifle;
COUNT III:
THEFT OF A FIREARM, a Second Degree Felony, in violation of Section 76-6404, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the said defendant, at the time and place
aforesaid, did obtain or exercise unauthorized control over the property of another, with a purpose
to deprive him thereof, to-wit: Winchester Model 70, .270 cal. rifle;
COUNT IV:
THEFT OF A FIREARM, a Second Degree Felony, in violation of Section 76-6404, Utah Code AnnoUted 1953, as amended, in that the said defendant, at the time and place
aforesaid, did obtain or exercise unauthorized control over the property of another, with a purpose
to deprive him thereof, to-wit: Mauser .243 cal. rifle;

000039

COUNT V.
THEFT OF A FIREARM, a Second Degree Felony, in violation of Section 76-6404, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the said defendant, at the time and place
aforesaid, did obtain or exercise unauthonzed control over the property of another, with a purpose
to depnve him thereof, to-wit: Savage .22 cal nfle;
COUNT VI:
THEFT, a Class A Misdemeanor, in violation of Section 76-6-404, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the said defendant, at the time and place aforesaid, did obtain
or exercise unauthonzed control over the property of another, with a purpose to depnve him
thereof, to-wit: bnef case, ammunition, VCR, two (2) wnstwatches, piggy bank, binoculars,
clothing, knife, jewelry case, 35 mm camera, campaign nbbons, valued at more than $100.00 but
less than $250.00;
COUNT VIIPOSSESSION OF A FIREARM BY A PAROLEE, a Second Degree Felony,
in violation of Section 76-10-503 (2) (a), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the said
defendant, at the time and place aforesaid, while on parole from the Utah State Pnson, did have
in his possession, or under his custody or control a firearm,

contrary to the provisions of the aforesaid statute, and
against the peace and dignity of the State of Utah.
This Information is based on evidence obtained from the
following witness(es):
Robert Setzer/ 644140 & 644135 & 940161.
Dated July 7^

, 1994.

fcqe &C HARMOND, Jr.
Deputy County Attorney
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ADDENDUM c

MOTION TO COMBINE THEFT OF
FIREARM CHARGES, ARGUMENT
AND RULING

1

THE COURT:

2 I Counsel in

I indicated that that

chambers.

Mr. Allred

was my ruling, to

indicated that

he had

an

additional motion or some such thing that he wishes to make.
MR. ALLRED:

Your Honor, if I could address the issue

5 I of Counts 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the Information, I guess we can call
6 I it the-THE COURT:
8 I
9

Of the--of--now--

MR. ALLRED:

We'll call

it the amended Information,

the very most recent amended Information.

10

THE COURT: The one that I've just authorized entered.

11

MR. ALLRED:

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. ALLRED:

Yes, your Honor.
Thank you.
For that count

14

being charged

15

second-degree felony.

16

taken place at the same time, at the same place.

17

with four counts

there, the defendant is

of theft of

a firearm,

as a

Each of those counts are alleged to have

The law would require that specific intent be alleged

18

for each

19

required for each of those.

20

the amendment, that I don't think that occurs, and I think that

21

these are all--occur out of one incident, and that it would be

22

inappropriate

23

charges, but that it would be appropriate for it to contain one-

24

-one charge of the theft of a firearm.

25

of

those, or

for

I don't

at least

a--a

specific incident

be

I think under the situation, with

the amendment

think the State

to

contain

is even

four

separate

alleging separate
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1

offenses--I

mean

separate--I

2

incidences occurring

3

believe, even

4

inappropriate for him to be tried on all four of those.

on

can't

this.

the same gun

say

offenses--separate

These all

cabinet, and

arose

out of, I

that that would

be

5

In my opinion, we'd have a situation where it would bel

6

similar to that of, not really a double jeopardy, but he's being)

7

tried on the

8

potential, and I don't think that's a--that would be a correct

9

situation.

10

same count four

THE COURT:

11

charges of

12

making.

different times, and

have that

Take four cupcakes from--do you have four

retail theft?

I guess that's

the point

you're

13

MR. HARMOND:

May I address that, your Honor?

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. HARMOND:

16

If the Court will note the construction of the statute!

You may.
Thank you.

17

under 76-6-412, which

18

Generally, that is classified as either a misdemeanor or certain]

19

category of offense, misdemeanor or felony, based on value.

20

And that's the

is classification

of theft

value of either the

offenses.

property stolen

21

and/or the services which were stolen, as in the case of cable

22

T.V. theft, things of that nature.

23

The exception to that is value--is property that is

24

either a firearm or a--an operable motor vehicle. Those two are

25

under separate subsection, being under 76-412.1 Subsection 2-Associated Professional Reporters
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1

excuse me, Subsection

2

theft of property and services as provided in this chapter shall

3

be punishable as

4

value of the property or services exceeds $1,000; (2) property

5

stolen is

6

(a), Subsection 2,

a felony of the

second degree if the:

(1)

firearm or an operable motor vehicle.
The reason

7

steal a

8

felony, it's not an

9

theft.

10

which says — states,

firearm or

As in

for the separate
a motor

counts is that

vehicle, that's a

second-degree

aggregated charge, as is the

the Court's

example, if

if you

rest of the

you steal the

four

11

cupcakes, what's the value? That's what you're looking at. But

12

the legislature has specifically carved out firearms and motor

13

vehicles to be classified as a separate offense.

14

That's the

reason

they're charged

that way,

your

15

Honor, is because each theft is a second-degree felony, by the

16

way the statute is written.

17
18

THE COURT:

How

does that play off on

the criminal

episode statute?

19

MR. HARMOND:
filing

four separate

episode statute

20

prevents

21

separate felonies at four different times; in other words, this

22

is a single criminal episode and

23

occurred in that criminal episode, including the four separate

24

thefts of four separate firearms.

25

me from

I think the criminal

felonies,

fel--four

I'm alleging everything that

If I were to file an Information today, if I'd filed

j

103
1 I an Information that alleged the theft of two firearms, and if we]
2

were not

3

firearms later on, I think that's

4

criminal episode statute comes into play.

5
6
7

successful today, I

I

can't put

criminal episode.

him

allege the

theft of two

other

where the single continuing

at jeopardy

twice

for the

same

another part of

that

That's what the--

THE COURT:

But

isn't there

8

statute that says--I'm

calling back, but

isn't--doesn't that

9

statute say that you can't charge two offenses--it--if the same

10

behavior is a breach of this law and that

11

charged on the more serious law. That's the part of the statute

12

that I'm trying to--to--

13

law, it can only be

MR. HARMOND: What is says is, that a defendant may be

14

prosecuted in a single criminal action for all separate offenses]

15

arising out of a

16

same act of the defendant under a single criminal episode shall

17

establish offenses which may be punished in different ways under]

18

different provisions of this code, the act shall be punishable

19

only under one such provision.

20

sentence under any

21

other provision.

22
23

single criminal episode.

An

However,

when the

acquittal or conviction or

such provision bars prosecution

under any

In other words, we have to combine everything we have
in one prosecution.

24

THE COURT:

Bring that to me, would you, please?

25

MR. HARMOND:

Certainly, your Honor, it's under-
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THE COURT: What you just read is just saying what I

2

thought I understand it to mean.

3

MR. HARMOND:

4

THE COURT: Mr. Allred, did you want to respond to--to

5

6-1-402.

that inquiry?

6

MR. ALLRED:

As far as the statements before, too, we

7

have that theft is one of the elements also of the burglary, and]

8

then

9

occurring in the same situation.

we

10

have

also charged

another

misdemeanor

theft

all

And to maybe look at this again in a different light
is if--if

12

cabinet, even itself, where the guns were contained, wefd still

13

have one incident of theft, and wefd still have to have separate]

14

incidences, separate elements and separate situations to--each

15

to warrant those.

16

an item,

let!s say

11

that he'd

just taken the

gun

Now, if we had separate situations, they could all--I

17

know the statute for sure says that they can all be brought up

18

at the

19

separate offenses, still, and to establish a separate offense,

20

you still have to have your own individual or your own specific

21

intent or your incidents to--to do that, I think.

22

same time

if itfs

THE COURT:

close in

I think that I

time; but we1re

talking

agree with Mr. Harmondfs

23

interpretation of this particular statute, that—that in fact,

24

the legislature

25

separate offense.

has designated that--that

each firearm

is a

I don't think that the--the criminal episode statute
affects that change in this particular case, where each of them
are individual, separate offenses under the--under the Code. I
think it deals with where there

are two--where the--where the

exact same conduct is punishable in two different ways, whereas,
this is--itfs the exact same conduct.
For instance, if--if he took
three guns in

it, that's the same

the--the gun case with

as the three guns

that he

took, but that as a matter of fact, he took the gun cabinet and
three guns, so that he could be charged with-MR. HARMOND:

Statute says

you111 determine

what

degree it is based on the value of the gun cabinet, but yet, the]
firearms part is separate.
THE COURT:

Separate and apart and on their own.

So, and that will be the ruling of the Court.
MR. HARMOND:
THE COURT:

Thank you, your Honor.

Bring in the jury, potential jury, if you

would.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:

Your Honor, may I approach?

THE COURT: You may.
Mr. Allred,

Mr.

Archuletta has

indicated that

he

wishes to be--to change clothes and not been seated in the--with]
his

cuffs,

and

I

think

that's

appropriate

under

the

circumstances.
MR. ALLRED:

Yes, your Honor.
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